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TRAPPED IN CHINA’S SHADOW? 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 
IN POST-WTO-ACCESSION RUSSIA 
William P. Lane* 
Abstract: Russia’s December 2011 accession to the World Trade Organi-
zation means that it has agreed to implement and enforce intellectual 
property (IP) laws in accordance with the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property. This gives some hope that foreign enter-
prises, frequently victims of IP infringement in Russia, will receive protec-
tion. Yet the parallel experience of China, which acceded in 2001, tem-
pers that enthusiasm because the WTO has been ineffective in stopping 
infringement there. This Note compares China’s and Russia’s historical 
attitudes toward IP rights, economic incentives to adopt Western stan-
dards, and institutional challenges to assess the extent to which the 
WTO’s performance in China can predict its efficacy in curtailing coun-
terfeiting and piracy in Russia. 
Introduction 
 On December 16, 2011, the Ministerial Conference of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) voted to allow Russia entry into the Or-
ganization as a full member.1 Russia’s accession presents a momentous 
contribution to the WTO’s goal of creating a unified system of liberal-
ized trade: as the last global economic power to join the organization, 
Russia will bring an estimated ninety-seven percent of international 
trade under the WTO’s regime.2 The vote is most significant, however, 
to Russia itself, closing its nearly twenty-year accession campaign.3 For 
Russia, WTO membership represents both symbolic international po-
 
* William P. Lane is an Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 David Jolly, W.T.O. Welcomes Russia as Its Newest Member, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2011, at B2. 
2 See id.; Director-General’s Statement on Russia’s Accession, World Trade Org. (Dec. 16, 
2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl213_e.htm. 
3 See Tom Miles & Douglas Busvine, Update 4—WTO Approves Russia’s Membership After 
Marathon, Reuters (Dec. 16, 2011, 1:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/ 
16/trade-wto-russia-idUSL6E7NG2ZW20111216. 
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litical acceptance and the more tangible benefit of increased global 
economic integration.4 
 Developed countries and their business interests also expect to 
benefit from Russia’s WTO membership through improved investment 
conditions.5 Nevertheless, such enthusiasm is tempered by Russia’s 
poor record regarding intellectual property (IP) protection.6 Weak IP 
enforcement enables Russian firms to copy patented technology and 
copyrighted material at great cost to rightholders in developed econo-
mies such as the United States and European Union (EU).7 Such fears 
are particularly great following China’s failure to uphold similar rights 
after its 2001 WTO accession.8 As a result, negotiations leading up to 
Russia’s accession vote focused on committing Russia to measures pro-
tecting IP rights.9 Yet the question remains: when Russia’s pledges are 
put into practice, will they be upheld?10 
 Part I of this Note addresses the historical and economic backdrop 
against which the likelihood of improved Russian IP enforcement must 
be assessed. It focuses on Russia’s accession campaign and the role that 
its poor IP enforcement played in framing negotiations. Part II dis-
cusses the state of existing Russian IP protections, as well as changes 
proposed during bilateral pre-accession negotiations with developed 
countries. It lays out a framework for assessing Russia’s potential com-
pliance by comparison with China, which shares several common traits 
as a large country transitioning into a market economy. Part III ana-
                                                                                                                      
4 See Russia Becomes WTO Member After 18 Years of Talks, BBC News (Dec. 16, 2011, 16:29 
ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16212643. 
5 See Deere & Company Applauds Russia’s Accession to WTO; Urges Swift Congressional Passage 
of Permanent Normal Trade Relations, PR Newswire (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.prnewswire. 
com/news-releases/deere--company-applauds-russias-accession-to-wto-urges-swift-congression 
al-passage-of-permanent-normal-trade-relations-133623788.html; Miles & Busvine, supra note 
3. 
6 See David A. Dyker, Will Russia Ever Join the WTO?, 4 Hague J. Dipl. 83, 90 (2009). 
7 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2011 Special 301 Report 25–26 
(2011) [hereinafter Special 301 Report], available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/ 
2841. 
8 See Intellectual Property Theft in China & Russia: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 153 (2005) 
(statement of Matthew T. Gerson, Senior Vice President, Public Policy and Goverment 
Relations, Universal Music Group) [hereinafter Intellectual Property Theft Hearing]; Panel 
Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
¶ 3.1, WT/DS362/R ( Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter IP Protection Panel Report]. 
9 See Intellectual Property Theft Hearing, supra note 8, at 157–58. 
10 See Brian A. Benko, Note, Russia and Allofmp3.com: Why the WTO and WIPO Must Cre-
ate a New System for Resolving Copyright Disputes in the Digital Age, 1 Akron Intell. Prop. J. 
299, 311–12 (2007). 
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lyzes whether Russia can live up to its commitments under the WTO’s 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) and bilateral agreements, despite facing the challenges of 
economic development. Part III will further explore if and how tech-
nology-exporting nations can ensure that Russia fully respects their 
companies’ IP rights through the WTO. 
I. Background 
A. Russia: From GATT Skeptic to WTO Applicant 
 Following the turmoil of the Second World War, twenty-four states 
convened in 1947 to sign the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).11 They sought mutually-beneficial reductions in trade barriers 
for the purpose of “raising standards of living . . . and expanding the 
production and exchange of goods.”12 Although many of the world’s 
largest political and economic powers, including the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France, signed the treaty, the Soviet Union 
(USSR) refused out of fear that opening its economy to international 
interference would threaten its commitment to a communist non-
market economy.13 
 In the early 1980s, the USSR recognized that limited GATT par-
ticipation might be preferable to isolation, and in 1986 petitioned for 
the right to participate in the then-upcoming Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations.14 The petition signaled to many in the West that the 
USSR was willing to loosen its restrictive trade policies.15 Several na-
tions, most notably the United States, nonetheless opposed Soviet par-
ticipation as inconsistent with GATT principles, citing the USSR’s goals 
of coercively extending non-market economic theories and political 
dominion over its neighbors.16 Yet after the economic reforms of Soviet 
Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and his successor, Russian President Boris 
                                                                                                                      
11 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. During the 1986–94 Uruguay Round, an amended version 
of the treaty—along with several subordinate agreements—became the primary document 
governing the World Trade Organization, which replaced the GATT. See Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. II, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/wto_agree_01_e. 
htm. 
12 GATT, supra note 11, pmbl. 
13 Id.; Peter Naray, Russia and the World Trade Organization 2 (2001). 
14 Naray, supra note 13, at 17–18. 
15 See id. at 18. 
16 Id. at 19. 
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Yeltsin, in the 1980s and 1990s, Western nations began to hope that the 
GATT system could generate market-oriented development in the 
USSR and its later former republics.17 The GATT granted the Soviet 
Union observer status in 1990, and the WTO, established in 1994 to 
replace the GATT, permitted Russia to begin accession negotiations in 
December 1994 in an effort to encourage its transition to a market 
on
as
Jackson-Vanik amendment to the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 that prevented 
nor al tr tions with Russia.25 Russia’s often belligerent stance 
                                                                                                                     
ec omy.18 
 Although initial projections expected Russian WTO membership 
by the end of the 1990s, a series of setbacks prevented a quick acces-
sion.19 Attempts to rapidly transform Russia into a market economy un-
der Yeltsin—particularly through tax reform and privatization—were 
opposed by the pro-communist Duma.20 A sharp downturn subse-
quently crippled Russia’s slow growth in 1998, revealing that reforms, 
especially those regarding financial and monetary policies, were not 
keeping pace with market expansion.21 President Vladimir Putin reem-
ph ized global integration after taking office in 2000, but reform has 
been slow.22 
 Despite delays caused by uneven market-oriented reforms, Russia 
entered negotiations with individual WTO members in 1998.23 Out-
standing Cold War tensions adversely affected this process.24 Some 
Western nations maintained Cold War-era trade restrictions, like the 
m  ade rela
 
orld Trade Org., http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
acc_
e Christian L. Broadbent & Amanda M. McMillian, Russia and the World Trade Organi-
zatio
 Renaissance?: U.S. 
Tra
n-Eurasian Renaissance?]. 
e, in Russian-Eurasian Renais-
san
 
17 See id. at 21–22. 
18 Id. at 20–22. 
19 See id. at 66–69. The shortest accession to the WTO was within three years of applica-
tion, with the longest prior to Russia taking fifteen years. See Handbook on Accession to the 
WTO: Introduction and Summary, W
e/cbt_course_e/intro_e.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2013); Russia Becomes WTO Member 
After 18 Years of Talks, supra note 4. 
20 Se
n: Will TRIPS Be a Stumbling Block to Accession?, 8 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 519, 533–34 
(1998). 
21 See Juliet Johnson, The Banking System, in Russian-Eurasian
de and Investment in Russia and Eurasia 335, 344–46 ( Jan H. Kalicki & Eugene K. 
Lawson eds., 2003) [hereinafter Russia
22 Suzanne S. Lotarski, Expanding U.S.-Russian Trad
ce?, supra note 21, at 29, 32. 
23 See Broadbent & McMillian, supra note 20, at 533. 
24 See Lotarski, supra note 22, at 32–33. 
25 Jeremy R. Regal, Note, Russia in the WTO: How Russia’s Institutional Idiosyncrasies May 
Impede Its Ability to Abide by the WTO’s Governing Cornerstones, 9 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign 
Aff. 97, 103–04 (2004). The application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Russia would 
prevent Russia from receiving Most-Favored Nation (MFN) treatment from the United States, 
potentially subjecting its goods to high tariffs. See Lotarski, supra note 22, at 33. The United 
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toward neighboring states, most recently exemplified in its 2008 armed 
conflict with Georgia, created additional tensions that threatened to de-
rail negotiations.26 Nevertheless, after a Swiss-mediated October 2011 
agreement between Georgia and Russia, the former became the final 
country to approve the latter’s WTO accession.27 Following a December 
16, 2011 WTO Ministerial Conference vote, the Organization welcomed 
Russia into its ranks, completing an eighteen-year-long process.28 
B. The Shared Benefits of Russian Accession 
 Both Russia and prior WTO members have something to gain 
from Russia’s accession.29 To many within the country itself, member-
ship in the WTO is a necessary geopolitical step.30 Given Russia’s prom-
inent international standing—including permanent membership on 
the United Nations Security Council—its absence from the rule-making 
functions of the WTO is notable.31 Despite Russia’s continuing strategic 
relevance, its outsider status in the international trade regime has pre-
vented it from gaining commensurate economic influence.32 
  Accession’s relevance to Russian prestige is outweighed by its sig-
nificance to trade.33 Although Russia has experienced generally consis-
tent economic growth since its 1998 economic downturn, it has largely 
done so by exporting oil rather than by creating a stable and competi-
tive manufacturing sector.34 Exclusion from the benefits of WTO mem-
bership, particularly the non-discriminatory guarantee of Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) status, has slowed Russia’s export rates, presenting an-
other obstacle to industrial growth.35 Many in Russia view accession as 
                                                                                                                      
States has granted Russia MFN treatment on an annual basis, but is unable to establish per-
ttp:// 
www
arry, Russia Declares Deal to Join Trade Group, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2011, at A10. 
n-
ish; t as too costly to be feasible. See Jolly, supra note 1. 
7; Regal, supra note 25, at 106. 
manent normal trade relations while the amendment is in force. Id. at 32. Although Presi-
dent Barack Obama has not yet pushed for its repeal, he has indicated that such a move can 
be expected imminently. Jackson-Vanik’s End in 2012, Moscow Times (Nov. 29, 2011), h
.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/jackson-vaniks-end-in-2012/448814.html. 
26 Ellen B
27 See id. 
28 See Jolly, supra note 1. 
29 See Director-General’s Statement on Russia’s Accession, supra note 2. 
30 See Naray, supra note 13, at 87. At the accession ceremony, it was even suggested 
that the WTO adopt Russian as an official language alongside English, French, and Spa
Director-General Lamy dismissed i
31 See Naray, supra note 13, at 87. 
32 See Regal, supra note 25, at 100. 
33 See Naray, supra note 13, at 86–87. 
34 See Regal, supra note 25, at 101–02. 
35 See Dyker, supra note 6, at 86–8
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necessary to diversify and modernize Russia’s economy,36 and have de-
veloped policies to innovate and invest in infrastructure in order to do 
so.37 Yet despite some foreign investment, Russia lacks the domestic 
capital to reinvest.38 WTO membership could thus have two benefits for 
te Settlement Body (DSB) ensures that, should 
Russia fail to live up to its new obligations, investor nations can find re-
lief through litigat
                                                                                                                     
Russia’s modernization efforts: it could increase both capital and tech-
nical information flowing into Russia.39 
 In general, other nations share Russia’s optimism about the bene-
fits of accession.40 Although Russia has retained a high level of protec-
tion over many of its manufacturing and services sectors, WTO officials 
have hailed its accession package as a positive step in opening the mar-
ket to long-term competition and modernization.41 Foreign investors 
hope that accession, in providing transparency and predictable govern-
ing rules, will improve Russia’s regulatory structure regarding trade.42 
Finally, the WTO’s Dispu
ion.43 
C. The Ongoing IP Problem in Russia 
 Despite the hope surrounding Russia’s WTO membership, some 
investors remain hesitant due to the country’s historically weak IP en-
forcement.44 A grey market of unlicensed copying has consistently un-
dermined the copyrights of foreign and domestic producers alike, with 
illicit DVDs and CDs constituting the majority of Russia’s audiovisual 
purchases.45 Software piracy is also rampant, with over seventy percent 
of all business software in Russia coming from illegal sources.46 Addi-
tionally, Russian servers host numerous websites selling unauthorized 
 
er, supra note 6, at 97. 
 in Russian-Eurasian Renaissance?, 
supr
onalism or Globalization, in Russian-Eurasian Renais-
san
3, at 89. 
M), 
http:
 Comprehensive Approach for Western Plaintiffs, 33 
Van
 Special Counsel, In-
tern ance); Dyker, supra note 6, at 90. 
36 Dyk
37 Id. 
38 See Z. Blake Marshall, Russia’s Investment Outlook,
a note 21, at 9, 13–15; Regal, supra note 25, at 104. 
39 See Maxim Y. Medvedkov, Regi
ce?, supra note 21, at 43, 49–50. 
40 See Naray, supra note 1
41 See Jolly, supra note 1. 
42 Kenneth Rapoza, Russia Confirmed as WTO Member, Forbes (Dec. 16, 2011, 10:02 A
//www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/12/16/russia-confirmed-as-wto-member. 
43 See World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO 55 (2011); David E. Miller, 
Combating Copyright Infringement in Russia: A
d. J. Transnat’l L. 1203, 1218 (2000). 
44 See Intellectual Property Theft Hearing, supra note 8, at 148–49. 
45 See id. at 115 (statement of Eric J. Schwartz, Vice President and
ational Intellectual Property Alli
46 See Dyker, supra note 6, at 90. 
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copyrighted recordings, largely due to outdated laws.47 While copyright 
infringement is the primary concern of IP rightholders, violators fre-
quently infringe patents on products such as pharmaceuticals.48 For-
eign investors lose billions annually to Russian IP violations, with the 
U.S. film industry alone losing $750 million.49 Moreover, the Russian 
go rnment itself loses hundreds of millions of dollars annually in tax 
revenue because of this unregulated audiovisual market.
ve
still leads the U.S. 
rad
                                                                           
50 
 Many hope that accession will foster some improvement, as the 
WTO has accepted Russian assurances that its IP laws, as reformed 
through negotiation, conform to TRIPS—the WTO treaty specifying 
minimum levels of IP enforcement.51 Yet the precedent set by China in 
the wake of its accession tempers such optimism.52 Despite joining the 
WTO, China has largely failed to protect foreign copyrights and trade-
marks, and has abused patented technologies from foreign sources.53 
WTO membership has provided some constraints on Chinese practices, 
notably through other states’ use of the DSB to rectify violations.54 In 
2007, the United States challenged several Chinese laws that it deemed 
inconsistent with TRIPS.55 A WTO panel found that China’s refusal to 
(1) enforce copyrights in unapproved works and (2) encourage the 
destruction of infringing works violated TRIPS.56 Yet despite these DSB 
actions and direct bilateral consultations, China 
T e Representative’s (USTR) Priority Watch List documenting the 
countries that raise the most serious IP concerns.57 
 Given China’s failure to protect foreign IP rightholders’ interests 
despite its nominal compliance with TRIPS, negotiators were more pro-
                                           
 Report, supra note 7, at 26. 
Report of the Working 
Part
RUS/70 (Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Working Party Report]. 
te 8, at 149 (statement of Matthew T. 
Ger
01 Report, supra note 7, at 21–22. 
ark violations, claiming that they did 
not nel disagreed, holding that they met all 
the 
 Report, supra note 7, at 19. 
47 See Special 301
48 See Dyker, supra note 6, at 90. 
49 Id. 
50 Intellectual Property Theft Hearing, supra note 8, at 117 (statement of Eric J. Schwartz); 
Dyker, supra note 6, at 90. 
51 See Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, 
y on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization, ¶¶ 1352–1353, 
WT/ACC/
52 See Intellectual Property Theft Hearing, supra no
son). 
53 Special 3
54 IP Protection Panel Report, supra note 8, ¶¶ 8.1–.4. 
55 Id. ¶ 3.1. 
56 See id. ¶¶ 7.1–.3, .191–.197, .395. The United States also challenged China’s thresh-
olds for criminal punishment of copyright and tradem
meet the standards of TRIPS Article 61; the Pa
applicable technical requirements. See id. ¶ 7.669. 
57 See Special 301
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active in addressing IP concerns with Russia.58 The United States led the 
effort to negotiate Russian concessions, concluding a market access 
agreement requiring greater efforts to dismantle illegal DVD and CD 
production, a crackdown on online distribution of copyrighted material, 
and several other promised measures.59 To further demonstrate com-
mitment to its IP obligations, Russia concluded a special side agreement 
with the United States in 2006 through letters between Russian Eco-
nomic Development and Trade Minister German Gref and USTR Susan 
Schwab.60 The Office of the USTR has already noted progress in some 
areas covered by this agreement, including promised customs reforms 
and optical disc factory licensing.61 Nevertheless, Russia remains second 
only to China in IP piracy, leading the United States to maintain Russia 
on its Priority Watch List of t ith IP concerns.62 
greement 
an increasingly globalized world, urged 
                                                                                                                     
rading partners w
II. Discussion 
A. The TRIPS A
1. The History and Content of TRIPS 
 The TRIPS Agreement, adopted January 1, 1995, represents the 
WTO’s effort to bring intellectual property under its purview.63 Before 
TRIPS, there were several non-GATT treaties governing IP protection, 
including the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Ar-
tistic Works, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property, and the Treaty on Intellectual Property with Respect to Inte-
grated Circuits.64 Nevertheless, developed countries, seeking to guaran-
tee their nationals’ IP rights in 
 
ons on Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization 1–3 (2006), 
ava
ister, Ministry of Econ. Dev. and Trade of the Russ. Fed’n 1–6 (Nov. 19, 2006), 
ava ization/96620.pdf [hereinafter IP Side 
Let
, at 25–26. 
light special concerns). 
58 See Intellectual Property Theft Hearing, supra note 8, at 158 (statement of Matthew T. 
Gerson). 
59 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trade Facts: Results of Bilateral 
Negotiati
ilable at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Results%20of%20Bilateral%20Negotia- 
tions.pdf. 
60 See Letter 07-69 from Susan C. Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative, to H.E. German 
Gref, Min
ilable at http://www.state.gov/documents/organ
ter]. 
61 Special 301 Report, supra note 7
62 See id. at 26 (listing China and Russia separately to high
63 See Benko, supra note 10, at 317. 
64 See Broadbent & McMillian, supra note 20, at 524–28. 
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a new agreement containing comprehensive standards that would de-
fine and enforce those rights.65 
 To the developed world, TRIPS offered several advantages over the 
non-GATT treaties, which were—and still are—administered by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).66 First, the Mar-
rakesh Agreement made adherence to TRIPS a condition of WTO 
membership.67 The Agreement thus created a uniform set of obliga-
tions for all countries seeking to benefit from the WTO’s liberal trading 
regime, replacing the prior fragmented treaties.68 In addition adopting 
 tre
t certain levels of 
rot
forcement procedures that each country must make available to 
      
a aty providing more modern and rigorous protection standards 
would better safeguard developed countries’ nationals’ foreign invest-
ments.69 
 The main GATT provisions, contained in Articles I and III, guaran-
tee the MFN and National Treatment norms, preventing one contract-
ing party from discriminating against the products of another, either for 
its own benefit or the benefit of a third country.70 Although these provi-
sions safeguard the rights of the contracting parties, they also effectively 
prohibit contracting parties from enacting certain laws.71 By contrast, 
TRIPS imposes an affirmative duty on states to adop
p ection.72 Although TRIPS incorporates the MFN and National 
Treatment restrictions, its chief goal is to mandate that countries enact 
laws incorporating developed economies’ IP norms.73 
 Part II of TRIPS defines the scope of protections that nations must 
accord to IP rightholders.74 This Part lays out rules for protecting seven 
types of IP, including copyrights, trademarks, patents, and circuit de-
signs.75 Although TRIPS incorporates the definitions set forth in the 
previous WIPO treaties, its levels of protection exceed those definitions, 
mirroring developed countries’ IP laws.76 In addition to defining the 
scope of protected rights, TRIPS also mandates a minimum set of en-
                                                                                                                
ty Rights in China: Technology Trans-
fers a omic Development, 2 Buff. Intell. Prop. L.J. 164, 170 (2004). 
llian, supra note 20, at 528; Benko, supra note 10, at 319–20. 
e, supra note 65, at 169, 170 n.44. 
73. 
0. 
iappacasse, supra note 65, at 169–70. 
65 See Mikhaelle Schiappacasse, Note, Intellectual Proper
nd Econ
66 See Broadbent & McMi
67 See Schiappacass
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 170, 172–
70 Id. at 170 n.46. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 169–7
73 See Sch
74 Broadbent & McMillian, supra note 20, at 528. 
75 Id. at 529–30. 
76 See id. 
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rightholders.77 States can bring DSB claims against others that fail to 
recognize a defined right or adequately protect it under domestic law.78 
 Trade specialists regard TRIPS obligations as unsuited to the 
growth needs of developing countries.79 In theory, well-enforced IP 
rights would benefit development in the long run: they incentivize for-
eign investment and technology transfer, allowing countries to modern-
ize their economies and strengthen their infrastructures.80 A modern 
economy will lead to domestic innovation, which a strong IP regime will 
further foster.81 Nevertheless, there are heavy short-term costs associated 
with strict IP enforcement.82 Accepting developed countries’ standards 
for IP rights necessitates recognizing foreign monopolies over critical 
technologies and processes.83 Granting such monopolies to firms in de-
veloped countries permits them to reap the economic rewards of selling 
to the developing market while limiting the reciprocal benefits of access 
to technology.84 Furthermore, the costs of implementing an adequate 
rot
                                                                                                                     
p ection regime can also be prohibitive, particularly for developing 
countries that lack the necessary expertise or resources.85 
 Although developed economies’ desire for stronger IP protection 
underlies much of TRIPS, the treaty contains several concessions to de-
veloping countries.86 The Agreement’s preamble acknowledges the 
need to account for “developmental and technological [policy] objec-
tives” in an international IP regime, including the “flexibility . . . to cre-
 
77 See id. at 530. Countries are required to provide aggrieved rightholders with access to 
nt and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consis-
tent for crimes of a corresponding gravity.” TRIPS 
Agr
ra note 10, at 317–18. 
chiappacasse, supra note 65, at 171. 
9. 
expeditious and fair civil proceedings, with relief available through injunction and adequate 
compensatory damages. Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights arts. 42, 44–45, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
Both administrative and judicial bodies must have the capacity to order preliminary measures 
enjoining continued harm to a rightholder. Id. art. 50. Section 4 of Part III requires customs 
officials, either upon request or by their own initiative, to take action against infringing im-
ports, including destroying or disposing of unlawful products. Id. arts. 58–59. Finally, TRIPS 
obliges countries to levy criminal sanctions against willful commercial-scale trademark and 
copyright violators. Broadbent & McMillan, supra note 20, at 546. Available punishments 
must include “imprisonme
ly with the level of penalties applied 
eement, supra, art. 61. 
78 See Benko, sup
79 See S
80 See id. at 167. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 168–6
83 Id. at 168, 171. 
84 Id. at 171. 
85 See Schiappacasse, supra note 65, at 168–69. 
86 See id. at 170–71. 
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ate a sound and viable technological base.”87 To that end, countries are 
free to implement TRIPS requirements as necessary to account for lo-
cal conditions.88 Furthermore, Article 31 gives countries facing national 
emergencies the right to issue compulsory technology licenses for oth-
er contracting parties’ patents.89 Finally, given developing countries’ 
legal and technical disadvantages, Part VI allows for transitional peri-
ods, providing developing countries with additional time to conform to 
TRIPS requirements.90 Despite these provisions, TRIPS requirements 
ping economies for the benefit 
f th
perts is 
nv
cess.98 Nevertheless, its jurisprudence has grown nuanced, stating that 
                                                                                                                     
are generally believed to burden develo
o e developed.91 
2. Dispute Settlement Under the WTO 
 Inclusion of IP rights under the WTO is particularly important be-
cause it gives aggrieved nations access to the DSB, and thus a remedy for 
infringement.92 Countries believing that their benefits under the GATT 
have been “nullified or impaired”93 by the actions of another member 
state may request consultations with the alleged infringer.94 If the parties 
cannot reach a mutually agreeable solution, a panel of trade ex
co ened to hear the case.95 The panel issues a series of findings regard-
ing the measure, as well as any recommendations for how the parties 
should bring their laws into conformity with WTO obligations.96 
 While the DSB is a relatively recent development, its approach to 
dispute settlement mirrors that of Articles XXII and XXIII of the 
GATT.97 The DSB’s approach to treaty interpretation has been mostly 
conservative and textual, emphasizing the primacy of free market ac-
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governments may violate the GATT with non-binding actions, and look-
ing beyond stated justifications to find protectionist effects.99 Some cas-
es even suggest the DSB’s capacity to advance liberal readings of WTO 
eat
ce com-
pliance.103 Passing TRIPS under the WTO system thus creates a judicial 
process to r 4 
orcement Issues 
R collapsed shortly thereafter, Russia agreed 
tr ies, accounting for non-trade norms such as environmental protec-
tion.100 
 If a party feels that a case has been wrongly decided, it may request 
review by the Appellate Body, which reviews the panel records and cor-
rects any erroneous legal interpretations.101 Upon final resolution of 
the case, the Panel and/or Appellate Body reports are adopted, and 
the parties negotiate how the respondent may correct any problematic 
measures.102 Should the respondent refuse to cooperate with the re-
port, the complainant may enact retaliatory measures to enfor
esolve any perceived issues with IP enforcement.10
B. From Paper to Practice: Russia’s Enf
1. Civil and Criminal Enforcement Provisions 
 The Soviet government did not recognize IP rights.105 The USSR 
first took notice of intellectual property rights—at the insistence of 
Western nations—as it attempted to integrate itself into the world econ-
omy.106 Its first concerted effort to adapt IP law to international stan-
dards came in the early 1990s, after an agreement with the United States 
to sign the Berne Convention in exchange for normalizing trade rela-
tions.107 Although the USS
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to undertake similar commitments, passing its first copyright and 
trademark laws in 1992.108 
 Part IV of the Russian Civil Code contains the current Russian IP 
enforcement law.109 Taking effect in January 2008, the law consolidated 
e 
 Criminal 
Code punishes violations of a certain severity with fines and imprison-
 subject to administrative action under Arti-
e 7
                                                                                                                     
th existing separate laws governing patent, trademark, and copyright 
into one comprehensive code.110 The norms governing Russia’s IP re-
gime, including definitions and enforcement policies, are mostly de-
rived from international sources; this reflects an attempt to harmonize 
Russia’s legal structure with its TRIPS obligations.111 
 In theory, Russian enforcement provisions under Part IV and the 
Criminal Code meet TRIPS requirements.112 Section 1250 of the Civil 
Code subjects infringement of any IP right to strict liability, giving the 
rightholder remedies through the courts.113 Additionally, the
ment.114 Smaller harms are
cl  of the Code of Administrative Violations, including fines and con-
 
enbrun, supra note 105, at 52. 
fringing goods and the materials 
used
violations and those causing more than 1.5 million rubles 
($51
108 Tief
109 Vladimir Orlov, Introduction to Business Law in Russia 231 (2011). 
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would have been purchased in the open market, or an amount in the court’s discretion be-
tween 10,000 and 5,000,000 rubles. Id. art. 1301. Courts are also empowered to grant equita-
ble remedies, including injunctions “preventing the actions infringing the right or creating a 
threat of its infringement,” and the destruction of any in
 to create them. Id. art. 1252. Courts may also order the dissolution of any legal entity 
that it considers a repeat or severe infringer. Id. art. 1253. 
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180–183 (Russ.). “[L]arge scale” copyright violations may be punished by a fine of up to 
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500,000 ruble ($17,250) fine or five years’ imprisonment. Id. The Code defines “large” scale 
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bles. Id. Repeat trademark 
,750) of damage can be punished by fines or corrective labor. Id. art. 180; Working Party 
Report, supra note 51, ¶ 1347. 
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fiscation of infringing materials.115 In sum, Russian law provides ade-
quate textual protection to satisfy its WTO obligations.116 
2. Implementation Issues 
 Despite the strength of Russia’s written law, weak implementation 
has generated criticism in developed countries.117 The government has 
been slow to adapt the law, on account of the lack of nuanced norms 
ove 118g rning IP.  The Russian website, AllofMP3.com, illustrates this 
problem.119 The website, which sold copyrighted music to subscribers, 
maintained contracts with collection groups that claimed to forward 
royalties to the artists, satisfying Russian copyright law.120 Yet the indi-
vidual artists never granted consent or received any payment.121 Such 
legal loopholes enabled AllofMP3.com to operate without being chal-
lenged in Russian court, thereby precluding foreign artists and 
rightholders from legal recourse.122 
 Furthermore, Russian courts have developed varying interpreta-
tions of the written law.123 Russia is a civil law country: the only sources 
of official law are legislative codes and federal agency regulations.124 
eveN rtheless, courts often turn to prior decisions when interpreting 
laws.125 Russian law sorts cases into two classes: personal, heard in 
courts of general jurisdiction, and commercial, heard in specialized 
arbitrazh courts.126 IP cases can arise in either, and the respective courts 
have developed distinct approaches, with arbitrazh courts more inclined 
to issue decisions favorable to IP rightholders.127 This division makes 
case outcomes are harder to predict for foreign and domestic plaintiffs 
alike.128 
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 Inconsistent behavior by Russian administrative and criminal en-
forcement agencies has likewise created challenges for foreign IP 
ght
as such as IP, also hesitate to apply maximum penalties, often 
sp
sian corruption and organized crime fur-
er
ri holders.129 Russian authorities do not engage in unannounced 
inspections of suspected infringement facilities, enabling counterfeiters 
to prepare for government scrutiny.130 The state conducts raids only 
selectively;131 when they reveal infringement, enforcement officials do 
not always prosecute and convict involved suspects.132 Investigation of 
internet piracy is also limited.133 
 Criminal courts’ leniency with IP violators exacerbates already-
poor administrative enforcement.134 Thresholds for criminal penalties 
are set in uncertain terms, such as “large scale” or “serious harm.”135 
Although the government defines fixed amounts corresponding to 
many of these thresholds, other countries consider them insufficient to 
deter criminals.136 Russian courts, particularly those in less-developed 
legal are
su ending sentences altogether.137 Furthermore, although courts rou-
tinely order the destruction of infringing works, they rarely act against 
the facilities used to produce them, enabling counterfeiters to repeat 
their violations.138 Thus, the legislative imposition of more severe crim-
inal penalties has not generated a commensurate reduction in piracy 
rates.139 
 The proliferation of Rus
th  complicates enforcement efforts.140 The Soviet government fre-
quently failed to provide its people with necessary goods and ser-
vices.141 Practices thus evolved to circumvent such shortages, including 
reliance on a strong criminal element to provide security and other 
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goods.142 Soviet officials also used their positions to procure goods for 
their personal supporters.143 
 This system of bribery persists in the Russian Federation, where the 
combination of heavy state-industrial interference and little oversight 
vate interests to influence government 
tio
ties on government-owned land.149 The government will also 
generates opportunities for pri
ac n.144 This practice is particularly widespread in the judiciary, where 
lack of institutional independence and low compensation drive judges 
to grant favors.145 Despite President Putin’s efforts,146 Russian corrup-
tion continues to undermine both domestic and foreign perception of 
the legal system as legitimate, and cripples Russian IP enforcement.147 
3. Russian Pledges for Reform 
 Responding to both multilateral pressures from the WTO and bi-
lateral conditions set by nations such as the United States, Russia has 
made several promises to increase its enforcement effectiveness.148 
These include agreeing to close administrative loopholes that allow 
counterfeit DVD manufacturers to renew their operating licenses and 
lease facili
grant customs officers greater authority and encouragement to investi-
gate suspected infringement on their own initiative.150 Russia has also 
increased enforcement through raids against infringing manufacturing 
and storage facilities, as well as action to reduce the number of pay-per-
download websites selling copyrighted material.151 The government will 
also apply criminal penalties at a level sufficient to deter future viola-
tions.152 
 The Office of the USTR confirms that Russia has delivered on 
many of these commitments.153 In 2010, the Duma passed legislation to 
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account for the government’s promises to the WTO, which included a 
Federal Law on Customs Regulation granting ex officio authority to cus-
toms officials, as well as amendments to the Law on Activity Licensing 
preventing the re-granting of licenses or leases to IP violators.154 En-
forcement agencies have also been more proactive in revoking the op-
erating licenses of counterfeiters operating on government property.155 
Likewise, the government has taken increased action against domestic 
servers that host infringing websites, fulfilling its commitment to com-
bat internet pir tion creating a 
ec
enforcement.161 This has contributed to a growing sense that TRIPS 
alone may not be enough to correct Russia’s IP issues.162 The compari-
son is apposite: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velo as “BRIICS” economies,163 a 
acy.156 The Duma also passed new legisla
sp ialized intellectual property court in late 2011.157 Set to convene in 
early 2013, the court will feature thirty judges specializing in IP law, and 
will act as an appeals court (below the Supreme Arbitrazh Court) for 
infringement cases.158 Several industries have already reported de-
creases in infringement, but it remains to be seen whether these 
changes will have a lasting widespread impact.159 
C. China: A Prediction of Russia’s Future? 
 Trade officials have viewed Russia’s WTO accession with greater 
scrutiny following China’s failure to meet its TRIPS obligations.160 Al-
though the WTO and its dispute settlement provisions have effected 
some change in Chinese practice, they have stopped short of ordering 
that China enact specific criminal sanctions, leaving gaps in Chinese IP 
pment (OECD) has designated both 
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set of large, still-developing countries that are not fully integrated into 
the world economy because of their historically closed markets.164 Even 
among the BRIICS, Russia and China’s respective post-socialist and so-
inves-
oth have developed 
ime’s content, complemen-
rit
                                                              
cialist legacies of state control are particularly strong.165 A closer 
tigation, however, reveals that the challenges and strengths facing Rus-
sia and China are not identical.166 
1. Predicting the Success of Municipal IP Norm Implementation 
 Historically, neither China nor Russia has had a strong legal or cul-
tural conception of intellectual property rights.167 B
IP laws as a response to foreign pressure to modernize and integrate 
their economies into the global system.168 As a result, the success of 
each country’s new IP regime depends on its ability to apply interna-
tionally defined norms to its local circumstances.169 
 Commentators have suggested that the degree to which global 
norms succeed in local implementation depends on both normative 
and structural factors.170 The normative success of a given regime de-
pends on the ways that the body charged with applying the regime in-
terprets it in view of national standards.171 An externally imposed value 
system is therefore inherently subject to local prejudices when inter-
preted by a local authority.172 Factors influencing this process include 
local authorities’ understandings of the reg
ta y (the extent to which international normative values coincide with 
local needs and preferences), and the local community’s perception of 
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the normative values’ legitimacy.173 Local norm applications may thus 
give rise to varying selective adaptations.174 
 There may also be several structural impediments to implement-
ing internationally based norms.175 In developing economies, scarce 
resources or underdeveloped legal systems may prevent full norm en-
forcement.176 In particular, consensus as to an organization’s purpose, 
location, accountability to a central authority, and cohesion between its 
individuals may all play a role in its efficacy.177 These factors, collec-
en the most 
ina’s enforcement issues have several common 
his resulted in a complete erasure of the legal concept that 
div
tively known as “institutional capacity,” can undermine ev
faithful interpretation of a norm.178 Thus, assessing Russia’s or China’s 
likely compliance with their TRIPS obligations requires an examination 
of both their willingness and ability to comply.179 
2. Selective Adaptation: Cultural and Economic Pressures 
 Russia’s and Ch
traits.180 One explanation is that their respective societies distort the 
norm during translation to local circumstances.181 Therefore, the two 
countries’ historical treatment of IP and their present economic situa-
tions may shed some light on factors of perception, legitimacy, and 
complementarity.182 
 Historical denial of intellectual property rights is a common aspect 
of the Chinese and Russian enforcement problems.183 The USSR and 
the People’s Republic of China both, shortly after their establishment, 
acted quickly to suppress private property rights and intellectual free-
doms.184 T
in iduals may control the products of their mental labor.185 What few 
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IP provisions did exist under Communism instead existed solely for the 
benefit of the state: the governments seized innovations that proved 
useful, while ignoring or banning those that it deemed potentially sub-
versive.186 
 Even before Communism, Russia and China both lagged behind 
the West in recognizing individual IP rights, but Tsarist Russia devel-
oped IP protections far earlier than Imperial China,187 passing its first 
copyright law in 1828 and extending protection to foreign authors in 
1857.188 Although Bolshevism eroded the economic basis for recogniz-
ing authors’ IP rights, the USSR eventually reformed its laws to protect 
erta
ts’ illegality, they willingly buy them, per-
ivi
although both countries provide strict criminal penalties, neither coun-
try’s authorities pursue them consistently enough to deter violation.197 
                                                                                                                     
c in moral rights in authors’ work, reflecting the vestiges of imperial-
era IP protection.189 By contrast, Imperial China never developed a sim-
ilar sense of individual ownership of ideas, leaving publishing decisions 
to the Emperor as protector of public order.190 Efforts to modernize 
the Chinese legal system led the pre-Communist government to adopt 
new IP laws, but the Communist revolution in 1949 erased them before 
they could gain any traction.191 Thus, Chinese perception of IP focuses 
almost exclusively on the public good.192 
 Under these systems, public awareness of, and respect for, individu-
als’ economic stakes in their creations dwindled.193 The lack of public 
education regarding IP undermines both the accurate perception and 
the legitimacy of IP norms in both cultures, which treat the concept with 
ignorance and even skepticism.194 Widespread public ignorance of the 
harm caused by IP violations has contributed to the growth of grey mar-
kets in both countries.195 While consumers in a grey market are gener-
ally aware of counterfeit produc
ce ng such counterfeiting as economically harmless.196 This ignorance 
carries enforcement implications as well: rightholders complain that 
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One cause of this is that the normative foundations of IP law are poorly 
understood by judges.198 Enforcement authorities will less likely investi-
gate such offenses, and judges and prosecutors will more likely treat 
suspected violators leniently.199 
  Economic factors also create obstacles to IP enforcement where 
the two are seen as non-complementary.200 Chinese development strate-
gies have enabled rapid economic progress.201 As a result of former 
Chinese President Deng Xiaoping’s gradual privatization and market 
opening,202 China has managed to shift much of its economy to manu-
facturing.203 Furthermore, modernization efforts and increased contact 
with Western technologies have enabled China to diversify by producing 
or
uticals and electronics, has muted pub-
                                                                                                                     
m e sophisticated goods.204 This has encouraged the growth of a mar-
ket for consumer goods, both within and outside of China.205 Chinese 
exports have grown both in volume and technological complexity.206 By 
contrast, the stagnation of Russia’s market during the 1990s has under-
mined its manufacturing sector, and its domestic market remains heavily 
import-reliant.207 
 The appearance of diverse consumer markets, though beneficial 
to China, created a series of additional pressures that have led to weak-
ened IP enforcement.208 Growth in demand for Chinese products gives 
China the incentive to boost its production by any means necessary, as 
continued demand for Chinese products largely relies on their cheap 
availability.209 China’s grey markets have taken advantage of this fact, 
using access to pirated foreign technology or counterfeit foreign 
trademarks to provide products at lower prices.210 Increased availability 
of goods, particularly pharmace
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lic outcry.211 Because piracy satisfies consumer needs while enabling 
uic
ly different.218 Russia’s independence from the USSR’s 
gid
 China, by contrast, has permitted a degree of independence by de-
sign.223 As part of its legal and economic reform prior to WTO acces-
                                                                      
q k short-term manufacturing growth, authorities do not frequently 
perceive IP enforcement as within their economic interests.212 Al-
though Russian enforcers are generally ignorant of IP harms, they do 
not face the same immediate demands for domestic products that im-
pede enforcement in China.213 
3. Institutional Capacity 
 Russia, like China, also faces significant institutional barriers that 
undermine its efforts to protect IP.214 Most of these issues arise from 
the common inability of each central government to police its outlying 
regions.215 This decentralization allows issues of institutional location 
and cohesion to disrupt each government’s enforcement mecha-
nisms.216 
 Although both China and Russia base their governments on direc-
tion from strong central authority, their vast land masses have catalyzed 
decentralization.217 The processes of decentralization, however, have 
been marked
ri  central control structure generated a rebellion in which individual 
regions attempted to secure as much autonomy as possible.219 By the 
end of the twentieth century, Russia contained eighty-nine substates 
claiming hegemony over their internal affairs.220 During his first presi-
dency, Vladimir Putin reduced this fragmentation, consolidating the 
smaller territories into seven districts governed from Moscow.221 Yet 
most administration remains left to local authorities, with little federal 
oversight.222 
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sion, China began experimenting with looser state controls in order to 
foster foreign investment and privatization.224 The government selected 
certain areas with a strong foreign commercial presence and granted 
economic privileges within those zones to test their effects on develop-
ment; it also granted the authority to implement the privileges to suit 
local needs.225 The government then expanded such policies, contin-
gent upon their success, to other provinces.226 Although recognizing 
uto
on agriculture.233 In-
                                                                                                                     
a nomy’s benefits for experimentation, China’s government still val-
ues central control.227 To ensure that outlying territories experiment for 
the good of the nation as a whole, the government conditions grants of 
resources on meeting centrally planned economic benchmarks.228 This 
has increased both local responsiveness to federal cues and local au-
thorities’ initiative.229 
 Despite disparate causes, Russia and China face similar challenges 
from decentralization.230 As the national governments of each country 
have ceded control to their local counterparts, different regions have 
developed at different rates.231 In Russia, urban and resource-rich re-
gions have developed deeper industrial roots.232 China’s coastal regions, 
benefitting from freer markets and more access to foreign capital, grew 
as trading centers, while inland regions still rely 
creased foreign investment in developed areas has brought greater con-
tact with international practices and norms, leading to more litigation 
over such practices and, thus, more judicial expertise.234 Furthermore, 
central governments often grant institutions in economically-developed 
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regions greater attention and support.235 Predictable enforcement 
therefore depends upon the region concerned.236 
 The independence of individual localities further impacts the in-
stitutional cohesion of each country’s enforcement authorities.237 Both 
Russia and China suffer from heavy corruption, albeit with different 
causes.238 In Russia, a legacy of government inefficiency generated a 
fertile ground for mafia interests.239 In China, the institution of guanxi, 
or informal favor-trading, has its nfucian culture and its sys-
tem of interwoven duties.240 Beyond overt corruption, IP owners also 
suffer from the m, particu-
rly
ia and China face similar nor-
mative challenges and institutional defects.243 The contrast between 
, however, sheds greater light on 
uss
roots in Co
 lack of oversight through local protectionis
la  in isolated or underdeveloped regions.241 Bureaucrats currying 
local favor are more likely to overlook infringement or minimize en-
forcement if they see doing so as benefitting local interests—often at 
outsiders’ expense.242 
III. Analysis 
A. China and Russia: Interpreting Global IP Norms 
 The IP enforcement systems in Russ
normative and institutional challenges
R ia’s probable strengths and shortcomings in the years to come.244 
Although Russia’s economic development strategy ensures that it will 
prioritize IP, the inability of federal bodies to constrain illegal actors 
poses a greater threat.245 As China has demonstrated, these institu-
tional challenges are harder to correct by either internal or external 
means than are normative challenges.246 
                                                                                                                      
235 See, e.g., Connie B. Carter, Specialized Intellectual Property Courts in the People’s Republic of 
China: Myth or Reality?, in New Courts in Asia, supra note 228, at 101, 107 (noting greater 
investment in the judiciary in large cities and Special Economic Zones based on need). 
236 See Special 301 Report, supra note 7, at 26; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode 
II ): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 901, 946–47 (2006). 
panying text. 
n, The International Movement to Stop Corruption: Should China Join?, 
US- t 1, 4–5. 
237 See Potter, supra note 215, at 191–92; Regal, supra note 25, at 122. 
238 See infra notes 239–40 and accom
239 See Regal, supra note 25, at 118. 
240 Paul D. Carringto
China L. Rev., May 2010, a
241 See Regal, supra note 25, at 125. 
242 See id. at 124–25. 
243 See supra Part II.C.2–3. 
244 See Potter, supra note 170, at 15–16. 
245 See infra Part III.A–B. 
246 See infra Part III.D.2. 
2013] Intellectual Property Protection in Post-WTO-Accession Russia 207 
1. Cultural Perceptions and Attitudes 
 Given the current state of IP awareness in both Russia and China, 
it is unlikely that the former will be more successful at establishing a 
onsc istent system of enforcement due to perception of norms as more 
legitimate.247 Contemporary leaders in both countries have publicly 
taken steps to signal their understanding and appreciation of strong IP 
enforcement.248 Presidents Putin, Medvedev, and several economic 
ministers have all espoused strong IP protections as part of their plan to 
bolster a nascent technology industry in Russia.249 China’s “Special 
Campaign” of increased raids and prosecutions reflects a similar com-
mitment at the upper echelons of government to more systematic en-
forcement.250 Nevertheless, public interest in pursuing IP violators re-
mains low in both countries, largely due to the lack of IP protection 
under socialism.251 
 As growing exposure to foreign trade increases public awareness 
about the economic impact of piracy, there may be more widespread 
grassroots support for increased enforcement.252 The pre-Communist 
te that such develop-
253 Despite the recent 
bse
 Even if the Russian public would recognize the need for greater IP 
enf for it may still be tempered by 
                                                                     
histories of Russian and Chinese IP laws indica
ment may occur faster in Russia than in China.
a nce of Western economic justifications for IP, Russia had, even dur-
ing the later Soviet era, some respect for individual authors’ moral 
rights.254 Because of this history, the Russian public will likely be more 
receptive to educational efforts, and thus quicker to embrace global IP 
norms.255 In the short term, however, such historical distinctions are 
unlikely to cause more consistent enforcement, as neither the Russian 
nor the Chinese people appear responsive toward Western ideals of 
individual IP ownership.256 
2. Can IP Rights Coexist with Economic Needs? 
orcement, its willingness to advocate 
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economic reality.257 The willingness of a local authority to give a norm 
full effect requires not only a perception of legitimacy, but also conver-
gence with present goals.258 Given the countries’ disparate economic 
conditions, the Chinese experience may not provide an ideal indicator 
of Russian success.259 Russia’s plans for growth, however, will likely cre-
ate similar pressures to those that China faces.260 
 Russia does not currently face the same type of demand for its 
manufactured goods that China faces.261 Rapid development initiatives’ 
failures deprived Russia of a similar industrial base.262 Counterfeiting 
and trademark violations are therefore not as endemic as those in Chi-
na: Russian infringement is more concentrated in entertainment and 
software.263 Because the demand for grey-market products is limited to a 
few select goods, attempts to eradicate those markets may prove less of a 
strain on the Russian economy, making the outlook more optimistic.264 
 Nevertheless, Russia’s entry into the WTO and its plans to mod-
ernize suggest that it will likely develop a greater need for foreign IP.265 
ussR ian strategies for modernization include a heavy reliance on for-
eign investment and the introduction of improved technology.266 This 
strategy, along with new opportunities resulting from integration into 
the global market, incentivizes appropriation of foreign IP to benefit 
economic development.267 Should Russian local authorities adopt as 
single-minded an attitude as have their Chinese counterparts, Russia 
may soon find itself with a manufacturing sector that, like China’s, re-
lies on misappropriated IP.268 
 There are indications that Russia intends to avoid such an out-
come.269 Presidents Putin and Medvedev have both touted the impor-
tance of reinvestment in Russian educational and research institutions 
as a primary use of foreign capital, providing the basis for long-term 
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growth.270 China has pursued similar investment strategies, but its cul-
ture has long embraced the idea of repurposing Western advances to 
strengthen the state.271 Modern Chinese IP law reflects this preference 
for appropriation through “indigenous innovation” policies that predi-
cate government benefits on the assignment of IP rights to a Chinese 
firm.272 By con the Soviet era, 
uss
orced it to create a 
ver
                                                                                                                     
trast, even as its economy flagged during 
R ia has proven capable of leveraging its resources to invent tech-
nologies that challenged those of U.S. innovators.273 Whether Russia 
ultimately lives up to its enforcement pledges could hinge on its ability 
to continue to do so.274 In sum, if Russia can harness foreign invest-
ment and develop its own IP, then enforcement of TRIPS standards will 
prove more economically appealing than adopting the Chinese model, 
basing industrialization on foreign innovation.275 
B. China and Russia: Implementation Issues 
 Although China’s development paints a somewhat dismal picture 
for the prospects of Russian selective adaptation, the latter’s greater cul-
tural appreciation for IP and a strong history of domestic invention make 
it more likely to embrace TRIPS norms.276 China’s enforcement issues, 
however, do not stem solely from misapplication of these norms.277 Insti-
tutional capacity also determines the extent to which Russia will follow in 
China’s footsteps.278 
 Although disparate routes to decentralization have generated simi-
lar challenges, China’s more systematic path has allowed it to develop 
unique tools to combat those challenges.279 China’s strategy of boosting 
economic development through limited autonomy f
le  for central control through its incentive system.280 In theory, the 
economic benchmarks China currently uses to drive innovation could 
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be converted to reflect IP norms.281 With resources and bonuses as a 
reward for prioritizing IP crimes, peripheral regions would be more 
inclined to educate themselves in IP and take enforcement actions that 
may be to the short-term disadvantage of local interests.282 Russia, hav-
ing fragmented in a less-concerted manner, has not yet adapted a simi-
lar means of promoting local compliance with federal priorities, mak-
ing it less likely to be able to compel local action.283 
 Whether China’s incentive system has actually proven a boon or 
bane to IP enforcement is debatable.284 It has provided a means for 
China to promote institutional cohesion despite the temptation to fa-
vor local interests.285 China’s drive for economic development, how-
ever, has suppr se China has 
sed
                                                                                                                     
essed other government priorities.286 Becau
u  its incentives as rewards based solely on economic criteria, human 
rights, the environment, and IP protection have been overlooked when 
their enforcement has not aligned with economic growth.287 Yet such 
problems seem more to reflect selective adaptation than institutional 
capacity: they pertain to the ends that China seeks through coordinat-
ing regional action, not its ability to coordinate.288 Due to its incentives-
focused approach, China’s institutional capacity to coordinate local 
policies is significantly more advanced than Russia’s.289 
C. The Value of Russian Reform Commitments 
 The causes, both philosophical and practical, of China’s failure to 
properly enforce IP can, to some extent, predict Russia’s success in re-
forming its IP regime.290 Differences in the two countries’ economic 
development suggest that Russia will encounter fewer difficulties in its 
selective adaptation of TRIPS.291 At the same time, China’s institutions 
have evolved to permit it to combat its incapacities in ways that Russia 
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cannot.292 Therefore, in assessing the probable effects of Russia’s re-
form attempts, its ability to guarantee enforcement will carry greater 
weight than its willingness to do so.293 
 Russia’s institutional capacity issues will affect its ability to imple-
ment its legislative reforms.294 By their very nature, legislative actions 
reflect a government’s willingness to undertake change; whether it can 
implement such change successfully is still subject to questions of capa-
bility.295 Russia has attempted several legislative efforts to plug en-
forcement loopholes, such as refusing to renew operating licenses and 
ase
he new Russian legislation 
ent that is 
nfe
                                                                                                                     
le s, and encouraging greater independent action by customs 
agents.296 Of these two, license revocation is less likely impacted by in-
stitutional issues like corruption and local prejudice.297 Because Rus-
sia’s factory licensing regime is administered by a central agency, rather 
than local enforcers, it receives greater oversight and is better isolated 
from regional concerns.298 Yet the regime suffers from a major weak 
link: identifying violators still requires individual prosecutors operating 
locally.299 This threshold requirement lays the groundwork for corrup-
tion that may prevent central agencies from ever addressing such in-
fringing activities.300 
 The expansion of customs officers’ authority may prove more sus-
ceptible to institutional defects.301 Although t
expands customs officers’ ex officio investigative authority and encour-
ages its use, the choice of whether or not to investigate rests with indi-
vidual local actors.302 While the combination of increased discretion 
and decreased scrutiny may enable more efficient enforcem
u ttered by excessive bureaucracy,303 it creates ample potential for 
local interests and organized crime to intervene.304 Further reflecting 
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selective adaptation issues, customs agents may simply refuse to attach 
priority to IP infringement because they do not recognize its harms.305 
Russia’s expansion of individual officers’ authority will thus likely exac-
erbate problems of local implementation.306 
 Russian pledges to ramp up enforcement through increased raids 
generate similar institutional and adaptation issues.307 Corruption, be it 
by the government or the mafia, remains capable of derailing planned 
raids or dissuading judges from punishing local violators.308 
 In addition, Russian judges may refuse to penalize infringement 
eav
                                                                                                                     
h ily because they do not find it economically rational.309 Central 
authorities’ commitment to increased raids suggests that the govern-
ment intends to ensure these raids’ efficacy, and a strong federal push 
by Putin could further pressure local authorities to resist corruption.310 
China’s “Special Campaign,” however, has likewise increased raids 
without a commensurate increase in convictions.311 Although some dif-
ficulties can be attributed to divergence from economic goals, the fact 
that China has not been able to ensure consistent local compliance 
through its incentive system suggests that Russia’s attempts to coordi-
nate will meet even less success.312 
 Finally, although the proposed IP court will be insulated from many 
of the most problematic institutional issues, its ability to remedy those 
issues will be limited.313 A unified IP court can solve the challenge of 
adapting global norms for national use.314 By setting forth common in-
terpretations of IP norms and transposing them into Russian law, the 
court can remove uncertainty caused by local courts’ differing interpre-
tations.315 Local judges will then benefit from the guidance of a more 
experienced bench, and litigants likewise will benefit from more consis-
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tent results.316 Furthermore, as a second-level appeals court, the IP 
court should operate centrally above the easy influence of private par-
ties.317 
 This isola ility to effect 
an
provides a 
central forum for grievances through the DSB.322 Under the WIPO 
 to petition on their 
                                                       
tion, however, will limit the court’s ab
ch ges in the law.318 Available only at the second level of review, the 
court hears a limited range of close cases, and can only respond to vio-
lations long after they have occurred.319 Moreover, Russia’s civil legal 
system attaches no binding force to the interpretations of most courts, 
so local officials can still ignore decisions that do not coincide with 
their personal interests.320 Therefore, although the new court should 
foster the development of uniform and modern methods of decision-
making, its function within the broader Russian civil system effectively 
limits its corrective role.321 
D. The Role of the WTO: Will TRIPS Matter? 
 IP industry leaders in the developed world have encouraged Rus-
sia’s accession to the WTO, in part because the organization 
treaties, individual rightholders had the capacity
own behalf, and individual governments were able to institute unilat-
eral actions such as sanctions or public denunciation.323 The DSB, by 
contrast, enables countries to bring the multilateral force of the WTO 
against noncompliant governments.324 The DSB’s ultimate ability to 
satisfy that role for Russia’s TRIPS obligations, however, is doubtful.325 
The DSB has not evolved to the point where it can effectively address 
he ct ombination of TRIPS’s uniquely affirmative nature and the likely 
causes of Russian noncompliance.326 Thus, IP rightholders may face the 
same insufficient recourse that they did prior to accession.327 
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1. TRIPS Obligations and the Impact of the DSB 
 Though it was negotiated and passed simultaneously with several 
other agreements, TRIPS establishes rights different from those guar-
anteed by the GATT and other WTO treaties.328 The DSB has proven 
quite effective at enforcing prohibitive norms.329 Its conservative textu-
alism, however, having developed to restrict state action, may not prove 
helpful in enforcing affirmative TRIPS obligations.330 
 The case of China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights illustrates the challenge of applying traditional 
WTO modes of dispute settlement to TRIPS’s positive requirements.331 
DSB panels’ textualist approach limits their ability to find violations 
herw e the law, as written, fulfills the treaty’s minimum requirements.332 
Yet many TRIPS standards are phrased qualitatively and are not subject 
to rigid interpretation.333 For instance, Article 59 merely requires that 
customs officials be authorized to destroy infringing goods.334 Accord-
ingly, because China authorized the destruction of infringing goods, the 
Panel did not consider China to have violated that provision, regardless 
of actual enforcement practice.335 Only where China’s laws failed to 
comply with literal TRIPS terms, such as allowing counterfeit trade-
marked goods into commerce after the counterfeit mark was removed, 
did the panel rule that China violated the agreement.336 
 In addition, DSB remedies may not prove sufficient to protect 
rightholders.337 Although commentators acknowledge that the DSB is 
more judicial in character than the GATT system, elements of mandated 
consultation and negotiated implementation remain.338 Protracted ne-
gotiations can weaken the effect of a panel decision, prolonging a 
measure’s economic harm while the parties attempt to negotiate a solu-
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tion.339 Furthermore, respondents are not required to compensate 
m
y enforce 
iders “commercial scale” in other contexts is irrelevant 
                                                                                                                     
co plainants, so violators effectively retain short-term economic 
gains.340 Finally, respondents sometimes refuse to comply with panel 
decisions, despite the threat of countervailing measures by complain-
ants.341 If the complainant is unable to exercise sufficient economic lev-
erage on the respondent to induce compliance, individual rightholders 
must still find other ways to avoid continued losses.342 
2. The Special Problem of Institutional Capacity 
 The fact that the most likely issues with Russian compliance arise 
not from poorly structured laws, but from their translation into prac-
tice, further complicates the DSB’s ability to adequatel
TRIPS.343 Although the DSB’s jurisprudence encourages panels to look 
beyond a measure’s text to determine its effects, this method has large-
ly been used in other WTO contexts to uncover hidden protection-
ism.344 None of the several panel reports involving TRIPS has focused 
on countries’ inability to effectively enforce their laws.345 Most, like Chi-
na—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights, have found violations only where the respondent has failed to 
correctly enact textual TRIPS norms into its national laws.346 
 Some commentators have suggested that, for cases of non-enforce-
ment, DSB panels should adopt an interpretive norm that focuses on 
implementation commensurate with community standards.347 By man-
dating a similar level of protection for all countries regardless of their 
respective circumstances, the WTO would give the greatest effect to 
TRIPS’s goal of guaranteeing global enforcement of strong IP rights.348 
 To some extent, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and En-
forcement of Intellectual Property Rights adopts such a view, holding that 
what China cons
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to hether its criminal thresholds for IP violation satisfy TRIPS stan-
dards.
 w
contained in the text of the treaties 
utional failures.356 A charitable reading of this absence 
of litigation implies concern for developing countries’ limitations.357 A 
more plausible explanation ing remedies against these 
oun
349 Nevertheless, the panel did not impose a strict reading of the 
community standard, finding that “commercial scale,” by necessity, had 
to account for the status of the Chinese market.350 One major reason 
for granting so much national discretion is that, like the GATT system 
before it, the DSB is generally unwilling to force countries to undertake 
obligations greater than those 
themselves.351 
 A strictly uniform requirement that does not account for local 
conditions fails to give effect to other stated TRIPS purposes, such as 
the use of IP law to assist with developing countries’ economic goals.352 
By specifying a particular level at which all countries must absolutely 
guarantee enforcement, the DSB would ignore the WTO’s significant 
concessions to developing countries that provide an advantage in un-
dertaking compliance efforts.353 
  Such recognition of developing countries’ implementation diffi-
culties may explain why no panel has yet ruled on the issue of non-
enforcement.354 This undoubtedly represents one of the most common 
threats to IP rightholders and their economic interests.355 Nevertheless, 
all violations thus far have been predicated on interpretive deficiencies 
rather than instit
 is that pursu
c tries would be fruitless: a developing country unable to apply its 
own laws will be no more able to do so simply because a WTO panel 
says that it should.358 Because the bulk of Russia’s enforcement prob-
lems are likely to stem from such institutional difficulties, the DSB pro-
vides no additional guarantee that developed countries’ IP rights will 
be protected.359 
                                                                                                                      
350 Id. ¶ 7.577. 
351 See Benko, supra note 10, at 325. 
349 See IP Protection Panel Report, supra note 8, ¶ 7.514. 
352 See Engelbrekt, supra note 97, at 124. 
353 See id. 
354 See id; Yu, supra note 236, at 931–33. 
355 See Creer, supra note 111, at 235–36. 
356 See Yu, supra note 236, at 931–33. 
357 See Engelbrekt, supra note 97, at 124. 
358 See Creer, supra note 111, at 236; Yu, supra note 236, at 937–38. Such proceedings 
could also be taken as unnecessary bullying by developed countries, leading to further 
friction with the developing world. See Yu, supra note 236, at 937. 
359 See Yu, supra note 236, at 931–34. 
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essary for its overall economic and legal reform, this ap-
proach would prove harmful to all parties involved. Russia requires an 
infusion of foreign resources, both intellectual and financial, to stimu-
late its growth. Increased aid through technical support will generate 
more progress than punishment through continued exclusion from 
trade. Unless developed countries commit themselves to aiding Russian 
development, Russia will not be able to commit itself to institutional 
reform. Russia’s economy will then have little choice but to continue to 
misappropriate foreign IP, truly giving the world a second China to 
reckon with. 
Conclusion 
 Russia’s problems enforcing IP laws are not a result of isolated non-
compliance. Though the concept of IP may meet resistance in transition 
economies like Russia and China, enforcement issues are largely symp-
tomatic of deeper problems with the rule of law in general. Therefore, 
Russia’s agreement to abide by the WTO’s governing rules means little 
in terms of ensuring improvement in the conditions for technology-
sharing and foreign investment. Relying solely on the multilateral pres-
sure of the WTO to correct these problems will be insufficient. 
 Although the imposition of TRIPS norms is unlikely to effect any 
change in Russia’s enforcement capabilities, Russia’s accession to the 
WTO should still be seen as a positive development for foreign IP 
rightholders. Russian distrust of IP norms and the deep institutional 
problems of corruption that undermine its reform efforts are largely 
byproducts of long-standing economic isolation. Necessity and igno-
rance have catalyzed illegal activity; increased economic integration and 
growth will give Russia access to goods and technologies that were pre-
viously only available unlawfully. If Russia’s development goes according 
to the government’s plans, the incentive to turn to mafia groups and 
corrupt government officials for necessary products and services will 
fade. 
 Yet the idea that economic strength can guarantee IP enforcement 
in the long term is of little comfort to rightholders facing losses today. 
In the short term, foreign investment remains something of a gamble, 
and there may be a temptation to punish Russia’s continued enforce-
ment failures with sanctions or a refusal to transfer technology. Yet if 
Russia is to have any hope of establishing the technological and indus-
trial base nec
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